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The implosion of the Soviet Union on the eve of December 25, 1991, has been heralded by
pundits and Sovietologists as an unprecedented event in world history. No one expected
the powerful Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) to come to an end as
uneventfully as it did. The implosion of the Soviet Union sent shockwaves throughout the
world. Not only did the Soviet Union cease to exist on that Christmas night, but it also lost
half of its territory and half of its population. Furthermore, the Soviets came to find out
the morning after that most of its weapons of mass destruction were now in the hands of
the newly independent states—former members of the USSR. But, perhaps most
importantly, the United States would soon realize that it had lost a common enemy.
Russia, since its inception, has been trying to find its place among the civilized nations of
the world. Is Russia a superpower? Or, is Russia an emerging power?
The rise of Vladimir Putin to power in Russia has set in motion a new attempt by
Russia to find its proper place in the world within what Putin calls an emerging
polycentric world order. Part of this emerging polycentric world order is Latin America.
According to Putin, in a recent interview in Russian Today (RT), he acknowledges that a
“united Latin America” is becoming:
an important part of the emerging polycentric world order. In this region, the traditions of
love of freedom and respect for other nations and culture are strong, and there are
practically no serious intergovernmental conflicts or the wish to pursue the divide and rule
policy. On the contrary, nations in the region are ready for joint action to protect their shared
Latin American home.1

While the United States and its Army have been active in other parts of the world and
Latin America has long been relegated to a second class region in terms of geopolitical
importance, evidenced by Secretary of State John Kerry’s announcement that the “Era of
Monroe Doctrine is Over,”2 Russia and Putin have shown that Latin America is firmly
becoming an important strategic piece in Russia’s game of geopolitics in the 21st century.
Despite the fact that Russian and Latin American diplomatic relations date back to the
18th century, the history of this relationship was not studied until the 1960s and 1970s.3
During the 1960s, Russian-Latin American relations were driven by the precepts of the
Cold War between the Soviet Union and its satellite state members of the Warsaw Pact
and the United States and its allies, member states of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO). During this period, Russia’s primary ally in the region was Cuba.
In fact, Russia was among the first countries to recognize the Republic of Cuba in 1902
after its independence.4 After the end of the Cold War, Russia was no longer the caretaker
of Cuba and had cut most of its subsidies to the island. Today, Russia is pursuing a
broader foreign policy goal which includes not only Cuba, but also member states of the
Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC). Of particular interest for
Russia’s foreign policy ambitions in the region are traditional partners such as Brazil,
Cuba, Venezuela, and Argentina. Latin America, based on its geographical location and
abundance of natural resources, is one of the key pieces of Russian’s foreign policy. In
fact, Putin has publicly stated that “Moscow’s cooperation with Latin America is a priority
for Russia’s foreign policy.”5 Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, in a recent visit to
Latin America, echoed Putin’s position vis-à-vis the region, stating that “Russia’s interest
in Latin America is an important part of forming a fairer, more democratic and
polycentric system of world order.”6
The importance of Brazil in Russia’s foreign policy ventures in this emerging
polycentric world order cannot be overstressed. Brazilian-Russian diplomatic relations
were established in 1828 and solidified in 1876 when Brazil’s Emperor, Dom Pedro II,
visited Russia for a personnel visit. Diplomatic relations between the two countries were
broken in 1917 when Brazil refused to recognize the Bolshevik Government of Vladimir
Lenin. In 1945, in the aftermath of World War II, Brazil once again reestablished
diplomatic relations with the USSR. In 1947, diplomatic relations were once again broken
only to be reestablished in 1961. In 1988, then President José Sarney visited Russia in his
official capacity as Brazil’s head of state. In 1994, former Minister of Foreign Affairs Celso
Amorim visited Russia as the first Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs to do so in that
official capacity. Since former Foreign Minister Celso Amorim’s visit to Russia, the two
countries have had friendly diplomatic relations and today Brazil is one of Russia’s main
partners in Latin America. As Putin recently stated, “our bilateral cooperation [Russia
and Brazil] is of strategic importance, as Brazil is a responsible member of the
international community whose political influence is steadily increasing; it is also the
largest country in Latin American and one of the leading economies in the world.”7

Russia’s foreign policy initiative toward Brazil is driven by its “Foreign Policy Concept
of the Russian Federation” and the “Concept of Long-Term Social and Economic
Development of the Russian Federation.” According to Alexandre Koval, a Senior
Lecturer at the Department of World Economy at St. Petersburg State University, Russia,
the main objectives of these two initiatives toward Latin America, but especially Brazil,
are “to diversify exports with an enlarged share of high-tech products, to increase
investments in the region, as well as the number of representative offices of Russian
Transnational Corporations (TNCs), and to develop collaboration with the regional blocs,
primarily MERCOSUL and the Andean Community.”8 Brazil is the second most
important market for Russian exports of fertilizers, and Russia is the leading importer of
Brazilian meat, as well as the second leading importer of sugar. Manufactured goods such
as machinery and equipment have been on the periphery of bilateral trade, 0.6 percent of
Russian exports and 9 percent of imports.9 Russian and Brazilian investors are highly
optimistic about Russian-Brazilian economic rapprochement. Over the last 10 years,
according to Putin, “bilateral trade has grown almost three-fold and reached $5.5 billion
in 2013.”10
During the Fédération Internationale de Football Association’s (FIFA) World Cup final
match held in Brazil in July 2014, Brazil’s President Dilma Rousseff warmly welcomed
Russia’s President Putin to Brazil. The purpose of Putin’s visit was twofold. First, Russia
will hold the World Cup games in 2018, and second, to discuss trade. Both Rousseff and
Putin signed an agreement designed to increase trade with the promotion of mutual
investments.11 Putin’s presidential and soccer diplomacy to Latin America has paid great
dividends to the Russian economy. Commercial bilateral ties between Russian and Latin
America are increasing annually, the total volume is today around $16.2 billion, double
the figure of a decade ago.12 Russian companies are also interested in the Brazilian
market and its potential as a gateway to other Latin America markets. For example,
Russia’s Rosneft and the Brazilian HRT oil and gas company are jointly exploring and
producing hydrocarbons in the Solimões river basin. Furthermore, in the southern state
of Santa Catarina, the Power Machines corporation is setting up production of hydro
turbines of up to 100 megawatts for Brazil and MERCOSUR markets. Also, BIOCAD, a
bioengineering company, is developing a research, educational, and training center in
Brazil with the goal of producing modern innovative medicines for the treatment of
cancer.13
In addition to bilateral commercial ties, Russia and Brazil are also establishing longterm technological agreements in the areas of defense, energy, and agriculture
cooperation. In a recent visit to Brazil, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu proposed
that Brazil and Russia join forces for the development of a fifth-generation fighter jet. In
response to this proposal, former Brazilian Defense Minister Celso Amorim told reporters
in Brazil that “more than buying military equipment, what we are seeking with Russia is a
strategic partnership based on the joint development of technology.”14 Russia has become

an attractive technological market place for Brazil since the Brazilian military is not only
purchasing the military hardware necessary but also the transfer technology which most
industrialized nations, especially the United States, refuse to sell as part of any technology
agreement. According to Carl Meachan, Director of the Americas Program at the Center
for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC, in 2013, Russia and Brazil
finalized a 5-year deal originally signed in 2008, totaling U.S.$150 million in which Brazil
acquired 12 military-grade helicopters.15
Other areas of interest between Russia and Brazil include defense against cyber
attacks. Brazil’s newly created Center for Cyber Defense (CDCiber) and the Brazilian
Government have become quite concerned about disclosures by former U.S. National
Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden that the United States had spied on Brazil’s
President Rousseff and members of her cabinet, as well as Brazil’s petroleum company,
Petrobras. This area of cooperation has great potential for Brazil’s cyber future strategic
goals. However, concern about such a close relationship between the two nations in terms
of cyber defense stems from the continuing allegations that the Russian Government has
for years been involved in sophisticated techniques to break “into computer networks,
including systems run by the Government of Georgia, other Eastern European
Governments and militaries, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and other European
security organizations.”16 Another area of cooperation between Russia and Brazil involves
Brazil’s education program known as Ciencia Sem Fronteiras (Science Without Borders).
This is an exchange program created by the Brazilian Government where students from
Brazil will be involved in cultural exchanges with universities in Russia. The Russian
Government has already stated that they are ready to welcome students from Brazil.
Besides Brazil, another key strategic partner in the advancement of Russian
involvement in Latin America is Argentina. In terms of trade volume, Argentina is
Russia’s second largest trading partner in Latin America totaling U.S.$1.8 billion,
followed by Venezuela with U.S.$1.7 billion, Mexico with U.S.$1.4 billion, Ecuador with
U.S.$1.29 billion, Peru with U.S.$725 million, Chile with U.S.$455 million and Cuba with
U.S.$225 million.17 Evidence of this cooperation between Argentina and Russia is
exemplified in their signing of a strategic association agreement during Argentine Foreign
Minister Hector Timermam’s visit to Moscow. This strategic association, according to
Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov, is based on “a common vision about the essence of
international relations, values, and objectives of common well-being that both nations are
building.”18 As part of this vison of common well-being, Russia and Argentina share the
belief that “there is need to create a new and more equitable polycentric world order
based on international law with the central and coordinating role of the United Nations
(UN).”19 In his efforts to emphasize Argentina and Russia’s common values and
diplomatic objectives, Putin often reiterates that the two nations are bound together by
more than a century-long history of close ties and strong mutual attraction. In fact, this
year marks the 103rd anniversary of diplomatic relations between the two nations.20

Argentina and Russia have not only strengthened their diplomatic ties but also their
bilateral economic agreements. During his recent visit to Latin America, Putin stated that
his primary mission while visiting his counterpart, Cristina Fernandez de Kichner, was to
discuss “in detail the whole range of key issues on the bilateral and international agenda
and lay the groundwork for joint, mutually beneficial projects in energy, including civilian
nuclear technologies, machine building and military technological cooperation.”21 In fact,
during this visit to Argentina in July 2014, Russian President Putin signed a nuclear
energy cooperation agreement with Argentina. Russia’s state atomic energy agency,
Rosatam, made an offer to pay for the construction of two new nuclear power units in
Argentina. According to Argentine President de Kichner, “Rosatam is also ready to
provide comfortable financial conditions to Argentina” in order to win the contract.22
In addition to rebuilding Argentina’s decade old nuclear power plants, Russia is also
modernizing Argentina’s air force by providing Russian built Sukhoi Su-24s in exchange
for beef and wheat.23 According to MercoPress, South Atlantic News Agency, the deal
involves a lease/lend of 12 Sukhoi Su-24 supersonic all weather attack aircraft, also
known by their NATO codenames—Fencers.24 Russia’s offer to provide Argentina’s air
force with Sukhoi Su-24s illustrates Russian penetration of Latin American armed forces
in an attempt to replace the United States as the country of choice when it comes to
armament purchases. In fact, Russia, in 2010, supplied Argentina’s air force with two Mi17 assault helicopters which are in service with the 7th Air Force Brigade. Obviously, the
modernization or acquisition of new military hardware by Argentina is a concern to
countries in Latin America as well as England. Russia is not only modernizing Argentina’s
air force with Mi-17s and Sukhoi Su-24s, it is also supporting Argentina in its longstanding dispute with the United Kingdom (UK) over the sovereignty of the Ilhas
Malvinas Islands or Falkland Islands. In addition to supplying the Argentine Government
with Russian weapons, Russian Defense Minister Shoigu recently announced that Russia
is planning to expand its long-standing military presence in Cuba, Venezuela, and
Nicaragua.25
From the time that Cuba announced it was a socialist republic in 1959 it has supported
Russia's attempts to infiltrate the Americas. According to Putin, Russian-Cuban relations
today, in the aftermath of the implosion of the Soviet Union, is based on the core principle
of strategic cooperation and long-term orientation. To show its future commitment to the
island, Russia decided in late-December 2013 to forgive 90 percent of the U.S.$32 billion
in debt that Cuba has owed to Russia since the Soviet Era.26 Furthermore, Russia and
Cuba signed two oil agreements in May 2014 with the intent to provide joint offshore
drilling opportunities.27 In August 2013, Zarubezhneft started drilling the first
development well in the Boca de Jaruco oilfield in Cuba. Zarubezhneft and Rosneft, both
oil drilling corporations in Russia, are actively engaged with the Cuban Government and
Cupet, Cuba’s state oil company, on several projects on the island.

Another major undertaking in Cuba by the Russian Government involves the planning
by INTER RAO to construct power units to provide electric power to the Maximo Gomez
and East Havana thermal power plants (TPP). Two others projects of tremendous
economic implications to Cuba involve the Russian development of GLONASS ground
infrastructure on the island to provide Cuba with products, services, and technologies in
remote sensing and satellite telecommunications. Finally, Russia is positioning itself to
assist Cuba, if necessary, with the upgrading of the Port of Mariel and building a modern
international airport with a cargo terminal in San Antonio de los Banos.28 The RussianCuban relationship intends to expand economic relations between the two countries
based on the intergovernmental Trade, Economic, Scientific, and Technical Cooperation
Program for 2012-20. This program focuses on major “projects in industry and high
technologies, energy, civil aviation, the peaceful use of outer space, medicine, and
biopharmaceuticals.”29 Moreover, Russia and Cuba are involved in increasing
humanitarian exchanges—not to be confused with the exchange of political prisoners.
This humanitarian exchange involves the Cuban Government “hosting Russian music and
theater performances and large-scale exhibitions” of Russian painters, sculptors, etc.
Russia is also, once again, actively involved in Nicaragua. Diplomatic relations between
the two nations goes back to when Nicaragua and its Sandinista National Liberation Front
(FSLN) ruled the country from 1979 until 1990. Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega of
the Sandinista National Liberation Front refers to Russian President Putin as “his brother
president.” Today, Russian-Nicaraguan relations are less ideologically and more
geopolitically based. Russia is particularly interested in the construction of the
Interoceanic Grand Canal, a new alternative to the Panama Canal.

Source: rbth.com/international/2014/05/14/russia_and_nicaragua_to_cooperate
_on_construction_of_new_intero_36645.html.
Figure 1. Canal Proposed by Russia and Approved by Nicaragua as
Alternative to Panama Canal.

In a tripartite agreement signed between Nicaragua, Russia, and China, Russia’s role
will be to guard the construction site against possible acts of terrorism, therefore
providing Russia with a large footprint in a region traditionally dominated by the United
States since the era of the Monroe Doctrine. As part of this tripartite agreement, Russian
“warships and aircraft” will be permitted to be present in Nicaragua’s territorial waters
“for the first 6 months of this year [2015] and also to carry out patrols of the country’s
coastline in the Pacific Ocean and the Caribbean Sea until June 30, 2015.”30 In addition
to allowing a Russian Navy and Air Force presence in the backyard of the United States,
Russia and Nicaragua have also signed several economic agreements allowing the Russian
Government to “construct two ports, an airport, and an oil pipeline, all of which is
estimated at a value of U.S.$40 billion.”31
Another key strategic partner for the Russians in Latin America is Venezuela. The late
Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez was part of the rise of the “pink tide” in Latin America
which occurred between 1998 and 2009 when leftist leaders, many hostile to the United
States, won elections in Venezuela (1998), Chile (2000), Brazil (2002), Argentina (2003),
Uruguay (2004), Bolivia (2005), Nicaragua (2006), Peru (2006), Ecuador (2007),
Honduras (2007), Paraguay (2008), and El Salvador (2009). This ideological bloc led by
Venezuela is also known as the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA). J. D. Gordon
argues:
Through its auspices, authoritarians bent on expansion and collectivism have carried out a
massive propaganda campaign against the U.S. and its regional allies in order to undermine
their legitimacy, while promoting socialism and systematic economic redistribution at
home.32

The strong ties between Caracas and Moscow are exemplified in its arms dealing.
Between 2001 and 2014, Russian sales of weapons to Venezuela totaled U.S.$11 billion of
a total sale to Latin America totaling U.S.$14.5 billion.33 It has also been reported that the
two countries have signed an agreement in which Russia’s Rosneft, Transneft, and LUKoil
companies will develop and possibly build a pipeline traversing Venezuela.
Putin does not hide the fact that Latin America is a key and very promising partner of
Russia’s foreign policy. Secretary of State John Kerry’s comment that the era of the
Monroe Doctrine is over has raised the perception among Latin American leaders that the
United States no longer cares about the region. As my colleague, R. Evan Ellis, has
written, “while neither Russia nor China can be expected to openly threaten the United
States in the near term, both are significantly strengthening economic and military
positions in the region, and they are moving toward a posture in which a conflict with the
United States is no longer unthinkable.”34 In the final analysis, the question becomes:
What are the implications for U.S-Latin American relations given a greater presence of

Russia in Washington’s historical backyard? Washington policymakers and military
leaders must pay closer attention to what is happening in Latin America and to Russia’s
assertion that cooperation with Latin America is key to Russia’s foreign policy.
The Putin Doctrine is driven by four overall objectives that Putin calls “the emerging
polycentric world order.” However, for the purpose of this article, the focus is on only two
of the four tenents as they apply to Latin America. Leon Aron, Director of Russian Studies
at the American Enterprise Institute, explains that the Putin Doctrine’s first imperative is
to maintain the country as a nuclear superpower.35 Given that Russia is replacing the
United States as an alternative weapons supplier to the region without discriminating to
whom it sells, the United States and its allies cannot afford to have or allow a militarized
Latin America emerge to supersede democracy and the rule of law, which are well
established. These young democracies of Latin America remain fragile and feckless. Also
part of Putin’s Doctrine is Russia’s desire to maintain and elevate its status as an exporter
of nuclear technologies.36 Russia’s Rosatom, the state nuclear corporation, has been
active in Latin America by entering into bilateral agreements with Cuba, Argentina, and
Venezuela. A nuclearization of the region could result in a nuclear arms race among
historical enemies, such as Brazil and Argentina. As Russia replaces the United States as a
traditional ally in the region, Russia will make extensive use of its soft power toward the
region. Putin may have only a few diplomatic tools at his disposal, but the tools he does
possess are attractive to Latin American leaders. Those tools include an abundance of
natural gas reserves, the second largest coal reserves, and the eighth largest oil reserves.37
Another important national security implication of Russian-Latin American relations
is the fact that Russian allies in the region are mainly regional leaders of the “pink tide”
movement, a group who consider the United States a traditional enemy and are
antagonists toward U.S. foreign policy in the region. A recent meeting between members
of CELAC and the UNASUR was convened at the request of Venezuela’s President Nicolas
Maduro in Montevideo, Uruguay. Members of CELAC and UNASUR issued a statement of
solidarity with Caracas and rejected any U.S. interference in the internal affairs of
member states. Members of CELAC and UNASUR have also demanded that the United
States cease its “exit now” strategy toward Venezuela. The U.S. “exit now” campaign
“aimed at the possibility of regime change in Venezuela and led to violent street
demonstrations in some middle and upper class neighborhoods” in Caracas.38
Since the United States is currently entangled in the war in Afghanistan and now
against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, Latin America has been relegated to its
traditional “benign neglect” status within the large U.S. foreign policy arena. The Barack
Obama administration’s de-prioritization of Latin America has created a political vacuum
in the post-American hegemony era which Russia is happy to fill and Latin American
leaders welcome. This power realignment is quite disconcerting given the fact that
Russian foreign policy is becoming increasingly anti-Western (i.e., anti-U.S.) and is

imperialist in nature. At this juncture, the United States should be pursuing a policy of
rapprochement toward Latin America. The United States should consider eliminating
trade barriers to Latin American products coming to the U.S. market, encouraging
multilateral agreements and interoperability among defense forces, creating a Latin
American plan to address the narco-trafficking within the region and between states, and
enhancing the exchange of information among national security agencies.39
In conclusion, I agree with the recent statement that R. Evan Ellis gave to the U.S.
House of Representatives in his testimony to the Subcommittee on the Western
Hemisphere that of all the possible challengers to U.S. hegemony in the 21st century
within the Western Hemisphere, no other country poses a greater challenge than the
Russians. As Russian cooperation with Latin America becomes a priority for Russia’s
foreign policy, Latin America will become even more important for the future of U.S.
security and prosperity.
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